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 Appellant Westport Insurance Corporation 
(“Westport”) appeals the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania’s decision declining to exercise 
jurisdiction over the instant case and its Order dismissing the 
case without prejudice and remanding it to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. Reifer 
v. Westport Ins. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512 (M.D. Pa. 
2013). It also appeals the District Court’s denial of its motion 
for reconsideration. Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., No. 4:12-
CV-0533, 2013 WL 2650275, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 12, 2013). 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the decisions of 
the District Court declining jurisdiction and denying 
reconsideration. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Rox-Ann Reifer’s (“Reifer”) Complaint avers the 
following: Reifer suffered a worker’s compensation injury 
during the course of her employment at Intermediate Unit-20 
(IU-20) where she provided special education to students. Her 
injuries prevented her from returning to work, and she 
retained Donald P. Russo, Esquire (“Russo”) out of concern 
that IU-20 may bring disciplinary proceedings against her. At 
the time she retained Russo, he carried legal malpractice 
insurance with Westport and was in full compliance with the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct as they pertained 
to insurance coverage. When IU-20 initiated disciplinary 
proceedings against Reifer, Russo failed to appear at the 
hearing. When IU-20 terminated her in accord with the 
hearing master’s recommendation, Russo also failed to 
appeal. Russo then filed a federal lawsuit alleging violation of 
Reifer’s employment rights, which he lost for failure to 
exhaust her state remedies. Finally, when Reifer sought 
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alternate employment, she asked Russo how to answer an 
employment application question as to whether she had ever 
been terminated. Russo advised her to answer in the negative. 
Reifer was terminated and subjected to public discipline for 
falsely answering the employment application. 
   
 On March 18, 2008, Reifer commenced a malpractice 
claim against Russo in state court by Praecipe for Writ of 
Summons,
1
 which was served upon him. At the time of 
service, Russo carried a “claims-made” policy with Westport, 
which only covered losses claimed by him during the policy 
period or within 60 days of the policy’s expiration.  Despite 
this, Russo failed to inform Westport of the action. That 
August, Russo’s policy lapsed and he failed to secure a 
replacement policy. Four months later, on December 29, 
2008, Reifer filed a Complaint that was served upon Russo. 
Russo only then notified Westport of the claim against him. 
 
 Westport refused to defend Russo. Eventually, Russo 
admitted liability but the issue of damages was tried in state 
court. The jury awarded Reifer a judgment of $4,251,516.00 
plus delay damages. Russo assigned to Reifer any rights he 
might have had under his legal malpractice insurance policy 
with Westport. On March 1, 2012, Reifer, as Russo’s 
assignee, filed the instant action against Westport for a 
declaratory judgment pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Declaratory 
Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7531, et seq. in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. 
 
                                              
1
 Pennsylvania allows a suit to be commenced by filing with 
the prothonotary a praecipe for a writ of summons or a 
complaint. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1007.  
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 In her declaratory judgment Complaint, Reifer argued 
that, under Pennsylvania case law and Pennsylvania Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.4(c), Westport was required to show 
it was prejudiced by Russo’s failure to notify it of her claim. 
Because Westport did not do so, Reifer argued it owed Russo 
a duty to defend and indemnify and requested a declaratory 
judgment that Westport “must pay” her judgment. (Compl. ¶¶ 
36–59.) 
 
 Reifer also filed another suit by Praecipe for Writ of 
Summons under a different case number. The summons was 
served but no complaint was filed. 
 
 On March 23, 2012, Westport removed the cases to 
federal court; no proceedings remained in state court. 
Westport moved to dismiss Reifer’s action on the merits. 
Reifer opposed the motion and Westport replied. In response, 
Reifer moved to amend her Complaint, which Westport 
opposed. Neither party argued that the District Court should 
decline its discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. On October 
12, 2012, a United States Magistrate Judge considered the 
case on its merits and filed a 39-page report and 
recommendation advising that Reifer’s Motion to Amend 
should be denied and Westport’s Motion to Dismiss should be 
granted. Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., No. 4:CV-12-0533, 
2012 WL 7998229, at *20 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2012). Reifer 
objected and Westport responded. 
 
 On May 1, 2012, the District Court sua sponte 
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. Reifer, 943 
F. Supp. 2d at 508. It rejected the Magistrate’s report and 
recommendation, dismissed the case without prejudice, and 
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remanded it to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna 
County, Pennsylvania. Id. Westport filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Reifer, 
2013 WL 2650275, at *1. Westport appeals both decisions. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although it is uncontested by the parties, 
we have an independent obligation to assure ourselves of our 
jurisdiction. E.g., Kendall v. Daily News Publ’g Co., 716 F.3d 
82, 86 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
 We have jurisdiction to review “final decisions” of 
district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether a district 
court’s discretionary remand under the DJA is an appealable 
“final decision” under § 1291 is a matter of first impression.2 
We believe that a remand order entered pursuant to the DJA 
is an appealable final decision because it is functionally 
indistinguishable from the remand order found appealable in 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713–15 
                                              
2
 In Henglein v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., we stated 
that “[o]nce a judgment disposing of all issues on which the 
parties sought a declaration is entered by a court, the case is 
ripe for appeal. Even if the court decides in its discretion that 
it will not entertain the case in any aspect whatsoever, that 
ruling is subject to appeal.” 260 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995)). 
Despite its broad language, Henglein did not deal with a 
remand, id. at 206, which we believe warrants particular 
consideration.  
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(1996). See Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
147 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
 As a threshold matter, we note that a remand under the 
DJA implicates neither a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
nor a defect in removal procedure. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 
does not preclude our review. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 
712 (holding that, because § 1447(d) must be read in pari 
materia with § 1447(c), its proscription against appellate 
review is limited to those circumstances implicated by § 
1447(c)); see also In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 146 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 
 In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court held that an 
appeal is the appropriate procedural mechanism to review a 
remand order made pursuant to Burford abstention where the 
circumstances satisfy either of the alternate holdings of Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 
460 U.S. 1 (1983). Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712–15. First, a 
remand order is appealable where it effectively puts the 
litigants out of court so that “its effect is ‘precisely to 
surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.’” Id. at 
714 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11). This effect 
is acutely felt in the context of remand orders whereby “the 
district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, 
retaining nothing of the matter on [its] docket.” Id. 
  
 Second, a remand order under the Burford abstention 
doctrine is appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine 
because it “conclusively determines an issue that is separate 
from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal 
court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest 
of comity and federalism.” Id. Additionally, such an order is 
 8 
 
“sufficiently important” to justify immediate appeal. Id. This 
importance arises, in part, from the fact that a remand order is 
otherwise effectively unreviewable. Id. 
  
 In Snodgrass, the Ninth Circuit held that a remand 
pursuant to the DJA satisfied both of these tests and was 
“functionally indistinguishable” from the remand order 
addressed in Quackenbush. 147 F.3d at 1167. We agree. The 
District Court’s remand order surrenders to the state court 
jurisdiction to declare whether Westport’s policy covered 
Reifer’s legal malpractice claim against Russo. It denies 
Reifer and Westport access to the federal forum, placing them 
“effectively out of court.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714 
(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11). Additionally, 
it “conclusively determines an issue that is separate from the 
merits,” namely, whether the District Court should decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over Reifer’s declaratory judgment 
action. Id. This decision is not reviewable on appeal from any 
final judgment eventually entered by the state court. Finally, 
we agree with our sister circuit that the propriety of a district 
court’s discretionary decision to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction under the DJA “is too important to be denied 
review.” Snodgrass, 147 F.3d at 1166; see, e.g., State Auto 
Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing the duties of district courts in deciding whether 
to exercise jurisdiction over insurance coverage cases under 
the DJA). Because it is “functionally indistinguishable” from 
the remand order found appealable in Quackenbush, we hold 
that a remand order pursuant to a decision to decline 
jurisdiction under the DJA is a “final decision” under § 1291 
and reviewable on appeal. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
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 Westport presents two main issues for consideration: 
(1) whether the DJA, the authority by which the District 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, applies; and (2) if so, 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in declining 
jurisdiction. 
 
 A. The DJA applies.
3
 
 Under the DJA, courts “may declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added).4 The 
Supreme Court has long held that this confers discretionary, 
rather than compulsory, jurisdiction upon federal courts. 
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942). 
This is an exception to the general rule that “federal courts 
have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred 
upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716 
(citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 821 (1976)).  
                                              
3
 We review the underlying legal basis for remand under a de 
novo standard. Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
4
 Although Reifer’s declaratory judgment claim was 
originally brought in state court under Pennsylvania law, the 
question of whether to exercise federal jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the controversy became a procedural issue under 
federal law. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers 
Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other 
grounds by Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc); accord Fischer & Porter Co. v. Moorco 
Int’l Inc., 869 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
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 Westport claims that the District Court did not have 
discretion to decline jurisdiction because the requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction were satisfied and the DJA did not 
apply. It argues that, although Reifer’s claim was couched in 
terms of a declaratory judgment, it was in reality a suit which 
sought a judgment compelling Westport to pay money 
damages.
5
 To Westport, the timing of the state court judgment 
                                              
5
 In a few sentences, Westport advances an alternate argument 
based upon Reifer’s other suit, brought by Praecipe for Writ 
of Summons. It argues that Reifer’s other suit constituted a 
claim for damages and that this claim for legal relief triggered 
the district court’s “virtually unflagging obligation” to 
exercise its jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817. Thus, 
Westport argues, even if Reifer’s primary claim was a 
declaratory judgment action, “there was, in fact, a claim for 
damages before the district court.” (Brief of the Appellant 
(“Appellant Br.”) at 22.) In support of its claim, Westport 
directs our attention to the Civil Cover Sheet attending 
Reifer’s praecipe. The Civil Cover Sheet indicates that money 
damages are requested, that Reifer’s action sounds in 
contract, and describes the action thus: “Assignment of cause 
of action for payment of verdict.”  
 We understand Westport to argue that the District 
Court had before it a “mixed claim” for declaratory and legal 
relief. We have never ruled on the legal standard a district 
court must apply when addressing whether it may decline 
jurisdiction when both declaratory and legal relief are 
claimed. See, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. of S.E. v. John J., 848 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Moreover, our sister 
circuits are “sharply divided” and advance four different 
standards. See, e.g., Perelman v. Perelman, 688 F. Supp. 2d 
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367, 374–75, n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (analyzing circuit split). Our 
district courts have also embraced competing approaches. 
Compare id. at 367–77 (adopting “independent claim” test), 
with Hartford Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (disagreeing 
with Perelman and adopting “heart of the action” test). 
Westport does not mention these competing approaches nor 
urge us which to adopt.  
 We need not, however, resolve this issue because we 
find that Westport has failed to show that Reifer’s praecipe 
alone raises Reifer’s action to the level of a “mixed claim.” 
Reifer’s praecipe was filed under a different case number than 
her declaratory judgment action. It says nothing of the 
underlying claim other than that it is a “Civil Action.” Reifer 
did not file a complaint in this case and Westport did not 
compel her to do so. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1037(a). Neither the 
Magistrate Judge nor the District Court ever mentioned the 
praecipe. Indeed, it is not even clear that Westport was able to 
remove it to federal court. See Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
416 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 2005); accord Gervel v. L & J 
Talent, 805 F. Supp. 308, 308–09 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Further, 
we are not persuaded by Westport’s heavy reliance on 
Reifer’s Civil Cover Sheet. See, e.g., Polanco v. Coneqtec 
Universal, 474 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(citing Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1007, 1017) (explaining that a Civil 
Cover Sheet is “not a writ of summons, praecipe, or 
complaint[,] . . . cannot be used to commence an action under 
Pennsylvania law[,] and is not deemed a pleading under 
Pennsylvania law”). Under these circumstances, Westport has 
failed to show that Reifer’s other suit divests the District 
Court of its DJA discretion, especially where we understand 
that the purpose of the other suit (as explained at oral 
argument) was merely to protect a future money judgment 
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establishing Russo’s liability is crucial. Because Russo’s 
liability had already been established, the declaratory 
judgment action was not prospective. Rather, Reifer’s 
complaint simply sought a declaratory judgment that 
Westport “must pay” the damages already awarded to her. 
(See Compl. ¶¶ 82–88.) Because “[t]here is no meaningful 
difference between a complaint seeking a declaration that a 
defendant ‘must pay’ damages and a complaint seeking to 
recover such damages,” Westport contends Reifer’s claim is 
legal in nature, not declaratory. (Brief of the Appellant 
(“Appellant Br.”) at 20–21.) Thus, Westport argues, the 
District Court had no discretion to decline jurisdiction.
6
 
 The District Court rejected this argument, finding that 
the instant case was  
 
precisely a declaratory judgment action. Reifer 
wants the [District Court] to declare that Donald 
P. Russo, Esquire was covered by the 
malpractice insurance policy issued by 
Westport at the time he committed legal 
malpractice. Westport wants the undersigned to 
                                                                                                     
claim from running afoul of the statute of limitations if Reifer 
prevailed on the declaratory judgment claim. 
6
 Westport warns that permitting plaintiffs to so stylize their 
complaints would “make a mockery of diversity jurisdiction” 
by permitting local plaintiffs to deprive out-of-state 
defendants of the right to a federal forum they otherwise 
would have when legal relief was sought. (Appellant Br. at 
21.) It argues that plaintiffs could plead “any ordinary claim 
for damages in terms of seeking declaratory relief.” (Id.) 
Thus, courts must focus on the claim’s substance, rather than 
its form, when deciding if the DJA applies. 
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declare that Russo was not covered by the 
policy issued at that time. The award of 
damages has, of course, already been rendered 
by the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton 
County. The [District Court] is not being asked 
to award damages against Westport; [it] is 
instead merely being asked to determine if 
Russo was or was not covered under his legal 
malpractice insurance policy at the time he 
committed legal malpractice. 
 
Reifer, 2013 WL 2650275, at *2.
7
  
 We agree that the DJA applies because in reality 
Reifer sought only a declaratory judgment. While Reifer’s 
Complaint admittedly uses the words “must pay,” in 
substance it requests a declaration that Russo was covered by 
the policy. Specifically, Reifer sought a declaration that, 
because Westport never showed that it was prejudiced by 
Russo’s late notice, Russo was covered by Westport’s policy 
at the time he reported Reifer’s claim. As the District Court 
noted, it was not being asked to award damages; both parties 
                                              
7
 The District Court’s characterization of Reifer’s declaratory 
judgment is not entirely correct. There is no dispute that the 
policy was in effect and that Russo was covered at the time he 
committed legal malpractice. Under the claims-made policy 
that governed the relationship, the dispositive question before 
the District Court was not whether Russo was covered at the 
time he committed malpractice, but whether he reported the 
claim to Westport within the appropriate time period. 
Accordingly, what is disputed is whether Russo was covered 
by Westport’s policy at the time he reported Reifer’s claim. 
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well knew that damages had already been awarded in state 
court. Id. Westport’s own filings indicate that the primary 
question was one of coverage, (Appendix (“App.”) at 97 
(“This is an insurance action in which Rox-Ann Reifer seeks 
coverage for a legal malpractice claim . . . . Ms. Reifer’s 
claim is not covered . . . .”)), a common issue in declaratory 
judgments. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Seelye, 198 F. Supp. 2d 
629, 631 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (noting the “all too common case” 
of insurance companies using diversity jurisdiction to seek 
declarations on purely state law matters). Additionally, 
Reifer’s status as Russo’s assignee undercuts Westport’s 
argument. In Westport’s own words, “it cannot be disputed 
that Ms. Reifer ‘stands in Mr. Russo’s shoes’ for purposes of 
pursuing coverage under the policy.” (App. at 188 (emphasis 
added).) 
 
 Moreover, simply because additional recovery would 
likely flow to Reifer as a result of a declaration in her favor 
does not preclude applicability of the DJA. Courts “may” 
grant declaratory judgments “whether or not further relief is 
or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also id. § 2202 
(“Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory 
judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice 
and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have 
been determined by such judgment.”); United States v. Pa., 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d 1071, 1075 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 57) (noting that a district court may 
exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment action where 
“another adequate remedy exists”); Alexander & Alexander, 
Inc. v. Van Impe, 787 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding 
that prevailing party in a declaratory judgment may seek 
“further relief,” including damages). Westport cites no 
authority for the broad conclusion that a district court may 
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never exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the DJA 
simply because another action resulted in monetary damages, 
the disposition of which will be affected by the court’s 
declaration.
8
 It may, in some circumstances, be possible for a 
party’s claim for legal relief to masquerade as a declaratory 
judgment, improperly activating discretionary jurisdiction. 
However, we do not believe that this is the case with the 
matter at hand.  
 
 B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
                                              
8
 We note that a potential unintended consequence of such a 
rule could be to permit an insurer, but not an insured, to bring 
a declaratory judgment action in precisely the same 
circumstances. Wilton is illustrative, although it did not 
address the instant issue. There, an insurer refused to defend 
or indemnify its insured. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 279. A jury 
awarded over $100 million against the insured. Id. at 280. 
After the verdict, the insurer sought a declaration that its 
policy did not cover the insured’s liability in that case. Id. 
Were the insurer to lose the declaratory judgment action, 
monetary relief would presumably flow to the insured. But no 
one could, of course, claim that the insurer’s declaratory 
judgment action was really a claim for damages. Thus, under 
Westport’s rule, the DJA would apply and the district court 
could exercise discretion. However, if the insured were to 
bring the declaratory action and win, monetary relief would 
also presumably flow to the insured. Westport’s approach 
would require interpreting this as a claim for damages and 
preclude application of the DJA. Despite being identical to 
the previous scenario (despite which party brings the claim), 
the district court would be unable to exercise its DJA 
discretion. Such an approach would be unfair. 
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 The instant case raises the question of the “outer 
boundar[y]” of a district court’s discretion under the DJA, 
specifically whether a district court may decline jurisdiction 
over a declaratory judgment action when “there are no 
parallel state proceedings.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 
U.S. 277, 290 (1995).
9
 It also presents an opportunity to help 
clarify this area of the law as many of our sister circuits have 
done. We ultimately conclude that declining to exercise 
jurisdiction over the instant case was not an abuse of 
discretion by the District Court because Reifer raises issues of 
state law peculiarly within the purview of the Pennsylvania 
court system which are better decided by that system. 
   
  1.  
 As a threshold matter, we must first address the 
appropriate standard of review, which the parties dispute. 
Invoking our holding in Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 
900 (3d Cir. 1978), Westport argues for heightened abuse of 
discretion review. There, we noted that due to our 
traditionally “liberal interpretation” of the DJA, “the ambit of 
the district court’s discretion is somewhat circumscribed and 
the range of our review is correspondingly enlarged.” Id. 
(citing Simmonds Aerocessories v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of 
Am., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1958); Dewey & Almy Chem. 
Co. v. Am. Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1943)). We 
concluded that a district court’s decision to decline 
jurisdiction “will be given closer scrutiny than normally given 
                                              
9
 The Supreme Court has described a “parallel” proceeding as 
“another proceeding . . . pending in a state court in which all 
the matters in controversy between the parties could be fully 
adjudicated.” Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495.  
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on an ‘abuse of discretion’ review.” Id. We have since 
described this standard as “heightened scrutiny,” Cost 
Control Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Pierce, 848 F.2d 47, 49 (3d 
Cir. 1988), and as a “caveat” to traditional abuse of discretion 
review, Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1073.  
 
 Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Wilton held that 
“district courts’ decisions about the propriety of hearing 
declaratory judgment actions . . . should be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.” 515 U.S. at 289–90. In rejecting de novo 
appellate review of district courts’ exercise of DJA discretion, 
the Court reasoned it to be “more consistent with the statute 
to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, 
because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory 
judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution, 
are peculiarly within their grasp.” Id. at 289. Since Wilton, 
this Court has applied Wilton’s teachings rather than the 
standard articulated in Exxon Corp. See, e.g., Summy, 234 
F.3d at 134.  
 The “closer scrutiny” required by Exxon Corp. and our 
subsequent case law expanding upon this “caveat” are 
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
traditional abuse of discretion review. To the extent that 
Exxon Corp. requires us to apply a standard of review more 
stringent than that articulated by the Supreme Court, we must 
deem it as overruled.
10
 We review a district court’s decision 
                                              
10
 We recognize the position taken by the First Circuit (and 
advanced by Westport at argument) that Wilton only 
“established the contours of . . . abuse of discretion review . . . 
where the denial is based on there being a parallel proceeding 
which presents the opportunity to ventilate the same state law 
issues in the state courts.” Verizon New England, Inc. v. Int’l 
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Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2322, 651 F.3d 176, 187–88 
(1st Cir. 2011). As a result, the First Circuit found it unclear 
whether Wilton had overruled its own heightened abuse of 
discretion review in a case raising issues of federal law. Id. at 
187 n.8 (citing Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. 
Corp., 45 F.3d 530 (1st Cir. 1995)). We do not share this 
concern and believe Wilton marked an end to the standard in 
Exxon Corp. Wilton did limit its discretion holding to the 
question whether “the District Court acted within its bounds 
in staying [the underlying] action for declaratory relief where 
parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation of 
the same state law issues, were underway in state court.” 515 
U.S. at 290. Applying Brillhart, it answered in the 
affirmative. Id. at 289–90. However, the authority that 
informed the Supreme Court’s standard of review holding 
was the DJA. Id. at 289 (“We believe it more consistent with 
the statute to vest district courts with discretion in the first 
instance . . . .” (emphasis added)). Admittedly, Wilton 
expressly declined to delineate the boundaries of a district 
court’s discretion when no parallel state proceedings exist. Id. 
at 290. But while this implies that the contours of a district 
court’s discretion can vary with the facts, it does not suggest 
that the standard of appellate review compelled by the DJA 
itself changes as well. Indeed, it is the district court’s peculiar 
familiarity with those facts that undergirded the Court’s 
rejection of a higher standard of review. Id. Consequently, 
our role is to ensure the “sound administration of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act” through “proper application of the 
abuse of discretion standard on appellate review[,]” thereby 
“provid[ing] appropriate guidance to district courts.” Id. at 
289. Because we find that this role remains unchanged 
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to grant or withhold a declaratory judgment for abuse of 
discretion. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289–90; see also Summy, 234 
F.3d at 134. Nevertheless, as discussed below, this does not 
mean that district courts’ DJA discretion is effectively 
unreviewable. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289 (rejecting 
contention that abuse of discretion review “is tantamount to 
no review” at all). 
  
  2.  
 Under the DJA, “any court of the United States . . . 
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added). This 
provision “place[s] a remedial arrow in the district court’s 
quiver” and confers a “unique and substantial discretion” on 
federal courts to determine whether to declare litigants’ 
rights. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286, 288. The “breadth of leeway” 
granted to federal courts originates in the “statute’s textual 
commitment to discretion.” Id. at 286–87. Consequently, 
district courts are authorized, “in the sound exercise of [their] 
discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment before trial or after all arguments have 
drawn to a close.” Id. at 288. 
 
 Although an exercise of discretion must be “sound,” 
the Supreme Court has otherwise framed DJA discretion in 
broad terms: “[T]he propriety of declaratory relief in a 
particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its 
fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning 
the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Id. at 287 
                                                                                                     
despite the absence of parallel state proceedings, we believe 
the Wilton standard replaced that in Exxon Corp. 
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(quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 
237, 243 (1952)). Rather than being subject to the “normal 
principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within 
their jurisdiction,” district courts exercising DJA discretion 
are governed by “considerations of practicality and wise 
judicial administration.” Id. at 288. 
  
 Over seventy years ago, the Supreme Court in 
Brillhart discussed relevant considerations for a district 
court’s sound exercise of discretion in a particular factual 
circumstance, namely, where “another proceeding was 
pending in a state court in which all the matters in 
controversy between the parties could be fully adjudicated.” 
316 U.S. at 495. The Court reasoned that the existence of 
such proceedings was relevant because 
 
[o]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as 
vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a 
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is 
pending in a state court presenting the same 
issues, not governed by federal law, between 
the same parties. Gratuitous interference with 
the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a 
state court litigation should be avoided. 
 
Id. The Court enumerated specific factors for courts to 
consider in such circumstances,
11
 but was careful to make 
                                              
11
 Courts should consider “whether the questions in 
controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which 
are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can 
better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court.” 
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clear that its list was non-exhaustive. Id. (“We do not now 
attempt a comprehensive enumeration of what in other cases 
may be revealed as relevant factors governing the exercise of 
a district court’s discretion.”).  
 
 A half century later, in Wilton, the Supreme Court 
addressed a “virtually identical” circumstance involving the 
contours of DJA discretion during parallel state court 
proceedings. 515 U.S. at 279. The Court affirmed Brillhart’s 
relevance. Id. at 282–88. It reiterated the non-exhaustive 
nature of Brillhart’s factors, characterizing them as providing 
“useful guidance.” Id. at 283. Despite noting the “unique and 
substantial discretion” granted to district courts by the DJA, 
Wilton narrowly tailored its holding. Id. at 286, 290. It 
expressly declined “to delineate the outer boundaries of that 
discretion in other cases, for example, . . . cases in which 
there are no parallel state proceedings.” Id. at 290. As 
discussed, Wilton established abuse of discretion as the proper 
standard of appellate court review. Id. at 289–90. 
  
                                                                                                     
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495. Answering this question may 
require inquiring  
 
into the scope of the pending state court 
proceeding . . . the nature of the defenses open 
there. . . . whether the claims of all parties in 
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that 
proceeding, whether necessary parties have 
been joined, whether such parties are amenable 
to process in that proceeding, etc. 
 
Id.   
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Brillhart and Wilton stand for at least two broad 
principles: (1) that federal courts have substantial discretion 
to decide whether to exercise DJA jurisdiction, and (2) that 
this discretion is bounded and reviewable. Accordingly, this 
Circuit has acknowledged the DJA’s grant of discretion while 
cautioning that “what is granted is an opportunity to exercise 
a reasoned discretion.” Bituminous Coal Operators’ Assoc. v. 
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 585 F.2d 586, 596 
(3d Cir. 1978), abrogated on other grounds by Carbon Fuel 
Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 444 U.S. 212 (1979). 
Thus, over the years we have enumerated factors for district 
courts to consider when exercising DJA discretion. We have 
required district courts to consider four general factors:  
 
(1) the likelihood that a federal court 
declaration will resolve the uncertainty of 
obligation which gave rise to the controversy; 
(2) the convenience of the parties; 
(3) the public interest in settlement of the 
uncertainty of obligation; and 
(4) the availability and relative convenience of 
other remedies. 
Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1075 (citing Terra Nova 
Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Bituminous Coal Operators’ Assoc., 585 F.2d at 596). We 
have also suggested that courts “seek to prevent the use of the 
declaratory action as a method of procedural fencing, or as a 
means to provide another forum in a race for res judicata.” 
Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1225 (quoting 6A J. Moore, J. Lucas 
& G. Girtheer, Jr., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 57.08[5], at 
57–50 (2d ed. 1987)). 
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Finally, in the insurance context, we have “suggested 
relevant considerations” for whether a court must decline 
jurisdiction under the DJA: 
 
(1) A general policy of restraint when the same 
issues are pending in a state court; 
(2) An inherent conflict of interest between an 
insurer’s duty to defend in a state court and its 
attempt to characterize that suit in federal court 
as falling within the scope of a policy exclusion; 
(3) Avoidance of duplicative litigation. 
Summy, 234 F.3d at 134 (quoting Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 
923 F.2d at 1075).
12
    
The insurance coverage context has been particularly 
fertile ground for exercising—and testing the boundaries of—
DJA discretion, especially since our decision in Summy.
13
 
                                              
12
 Though not implicated here, we have also concluded that 
where the issues include “federal statutory interpretation, the 
government’s choice of a federal forum, an issue of sovereign 
immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceeding,” district 
courts’ discretion to decline jurisdiction is not “open-ended.” 
Summy, 234 F.3d at 134 (citing Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 
F.2d at 1076–79). 
13
 In Summy, a property owner and its insurer disputed 
whether an insurance policy covered the poisoning of a child 
in his home, allegedly due to lead paint. 234 F.3d at 131–32. 
The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in federal 
court regarding its duty to cover the owner. Id. at 132. The 
owner moved to dismiss or stay, arguing that the District 
Court should decline jurisdiction. Id. Subsequently, the owner 
filed for a declaratory judgment in state court, which the 
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See, e.g., Seelye, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (finding such cases 
“all too common”). In Summy, we addressed the common 
case of an insurance company invoking diversity jurisdiction 
to seek a declaratory judgment on a purely state law matter 
and articulated now oft-quoted language: “The desire of 
insurance companies and their insureds to receive 
declarations in federal court on matters of purely state law has 
no special call on the federal forum.” 234 F.3d at 136. 
 
Summy provided other guidance as well. It concluded 
that when applicable state law is “uncertain or undetermined, 
district courts should be particularly reluctant” to exercise 
                                                                                                     
insurer moved to dismiss. Id. The District Court retained 
jurisdiction and granted the insurer’s summary judgment 
motion. Id. At the time the District Court decided to exercise 
its jurisdiction, only two Pennsylvania trial courts had ruled 
on the issue, and both were later appealed. Id. The Third 
Circuit vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss 
because assuming jurisdiction was not a “sound” exercise of 
discretion. Id. at 136. It noted that judicial efficiency was not 
promoted when evidence was considered by both federal and 
state courts and where federal court jurisdiction interfered 
with the state court’s ability efficiently to resolve the 
declaratory judgment and underlying tort action. Id. at 135–
36. Additionally, jurisdiction was a “vexatious” and 
“gratuitous interference” with state litigation because two trial 
court decisions, but no appellate cases, existed when the 
District Court decided the issue, and the state forum was 
“fully able and prepared to resolve [the] purely state law 
issue.” Id. at 136 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). Finally, 
no federal interests were promoted because the case involved 
no federal question. Id. 
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DJA jurisdiction. Id. at 135. Rather, the proper relationship 
between federal and state courts requires district courts to 
“step back” and permit state courts to resolve unsettled state 
law matters. Id. at 136. It found that “the state’s interest in 
resolving its own law must not be given short shrift simply 
because [parties] perceive some advantage in the federal 
forum.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hen the state law is firmly 
established, there would seem to be even less reason for the 
parties to resort to the federal courts. Unusual circumstances 
may occasionally justify such action, but declaratory 
judgments in such cases should be rare.” Id. 
 
Additionally, Summy concluded that federal courts 
should decline jurisdiction where “doing so would promote 
judicial economy by avoiding duplicative and piecemeal 
litigation.” Id. at 135. It also noted that such insurance cases 
lack a federal question or interest. Id. at 136. Finally, Summy 
found that district courts should weigh a party’s “vigorous 
objection” to the district court’s assumption of jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 
  3. 
 Of course, Summy involved the existence of a pending 
state court case involving the same issue. Id. at 131. We have 
never squarely addressed the contours of DJA discretion in 
the absence of pending parallel state proceedings. Facing this 
open question, our district courts have applied Summy with 
varying results. 
 
 In the instant matter, the District Court declined 
jurisdiction sua sponte, citing the “trend” of federal district 
courts in Pennsylvania “to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
 26 
 
over declaratory judgment actions, involving an insurance 
company, that are solely brought on diversity, and have no 
federal question or interest.” Reifer, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 508. It 
recognized, however, that the propriety of doing so was “not 
settled law.” Id. The District Court quoted extensively from 
Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Owens, No. 
11-4, 2011 WL 94412 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2011), and, 
following that case, rejected the interpretation that Summy 
compelled it, per se, to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of 
a pending parallel state proceeding. Id. at 509–11. In doing 
so, the District Court expressed concern that requiring courts 
to retain jurisdiction simply because no parallel proceedings 
have been filed could invite forum shopping.
14
 Id. at 511. The 
District Court concluded that “[f]or the sake of comity,” it 
would follow this trend and “decline to exercise jurisdiction 
over this purely state law issue.” Id.  
 Westport advances multiple arguments contending that 
the District Court abused its discretion. First, it argues that the 
three Summy factors enumerated above, which it claims “are 
controlling,” are not implicated in this case. (Appellant Br. 
24–26, 28.) The issues are not pending in state court; there is 
no conflict between Westport’s duty to defend, if any, and its 
claim of non-coverage; and there is no risk of duplicative 
litigation.  Westport also argues that, because the District 
Court declined jurisdiction a year after removal, and after the 
Magistrate Judge issued a 39-page ruling, considerations of 
                                              
14
 Specifically, an insurer, instead of filing a declaratory 
judgment action, could wait for the insured to file the same in 
state court. Reifer, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 511. It could then 
remove the case to federal court assured that the lack of 
parallel state proceedings would prevent the district court 
from declining jurisdiction. Id. 
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judicial economy and fairness militate toward exercising 
jurisdiction. Additionally, Westport contends that the issue of 
Pennsylvania law raised by Reifer’s claim is well settled and 
that the District Court was sufficiently equipped to apply it.
15
  
 
 Finally, Westport argues that Owens was incorrectly 
decided and that the District Court abused its discretion in 
following its lead. The “trend” identified by the District Court 
is instead a “misappli[cation] of Summy,” whereby district 
courts “dismiss, by rote, declaratory judgment suits involving 
insurance coverage without considering the particular facts of 
cases in light of the Summy factors.” (Reply Brief of the 
Appellant (“Appellant Reply Br.”) at 11.) Westport reads 
Summy only to apply when “a state court is poised to apply its 
law in a related proceeding and the federal court has no 
interest of its own.” (Id. at 12.) Thus, it concludes, Summy’s 
three factors “pertain to situations in which related 
proceedings are or may be brought in state court.” (Id.)  
 Consequently, Westport contends that, in the absence 
of pending parallel state proceedings, “the district court 
should proceed to resolve the parties’ dispute, even in the 
absence of a federal question or interest.”16 (Appellant Br. at 
                                              
15
 Westport also argues that it is fundamentally unfair to 
permit Reifer to raise the jurisdictional issue after the 
Magistrate Judge’s unfavorable ruling. However, as noted 
above, the District Court raised its jurisdiction sua sponte. Id.  
16
 In its Reply Brief, Westport clarifies its position: “Westport 
is not arguing that parallel state court proceedings must be 
present before a district court may dismiss a declaratory 
judgment action. But, in the absence of related proceedings, 
the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action should be the 
exception, not the rule, and the mere absence of a unique 
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29.) Specifically, Westport argues that the absence of a 
federal question or interest is insufficient reason, by itself, to 
decline jurisdiction under the DJA. Where no pending parallel 
state proceedings exist, “the district court should normally 
adjudicate such claims within the jurisdiction afforded to it by 
Congress.”17 (Appellant Reply Br. at 13.)  
 Westport’s arguments and the District Court’s decision 
require us to resolve two issues: (1) the effect on a district 
court’s DJA discretion of the absence of pending parallel state 
proceedings, and (2) assuming the district court maintains 
discretion in such circumstances, the scope of that discretion. 
 
  4.  
                                                                                                     
federal substantive interest in the dispute should not be 
sufficient to warrant dismissal under such circumstances.” 
(Appellant Reply Br. at 14 n.2 (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. 
Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2005)).) 
17
 Westport also takes issue with the District Court’s forum 
shopping concerns. The District Court was concerned that a 
rule that required it to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of 
parallel state proceedings could lead to manipulation and 
forum shopping. Reifer, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 511. Rather than 
address this, Westport argues that the District Court’s concern 
is irrelevant because Reifer failed to present evidence that 
Westport was forum shopping. Westport’s argument misses 
the mark. The District Court did not imply that Westport 
engaged in forum shopping, nor did it consider forum 
shopping as a factor when determining whether to exercise 
jurisdiction. Rather, the District Court cited the potential for 
forum shopping as a reason against adopting a rule 
compelling it to always exercise jurisdiction in the absence of 
parallel state proceedings. Id.  
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We have previously noted that, pursuant to Brillhart, 
“the mere existence of a related state court proceeding” does 
not require a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
under the DJA. Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1075 
(citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). We have not yet addressed 
the related question of whether the mere non-existence of 
pending parallel state court proceedings requires the district 
court to exercise its jurisdiction and hear the case under the 
DJA. The Supreme Court and this Circuit have long noted the 
importance of pending parallel state proceedings as a 
consideration in a district court’s exercise of jurisdictional 
discretion under the DJA. E.g., Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494; 
Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1224. Despite this focus, no binding 
authority has held that a district court has no—or less—
discretion to decline jurisdiction in the absence of such 
proceedings.
18
 Brillhart and Wilton only discussed DJA 
discretion in the context of pending parallel state proceedings 
because that is the factual context with which they were 
faced. Thus, they illustrate only one application of DJA 
discretion to a fact pattern that included the existence of 
parallel state proceedings. They do not stand for the 
proposition that DJA discretion has no life beyond the 
circumstances to which they applied it. See Wilton, 515 U.S. 
at 288 n.2 (suggesting that pendency of a state proceeding is 
but one ground upon which jurisdiction may be declined); 
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495 (“We do not now attempt a 
comprehensive enumeration of what in other cases may be 
                                              
18
 At most, Wilton implies that district courts’ discretion may 
be more circumscribed where no parallel state proceedings 
exist. See 515 U.S. at 290 (describing the absence of parallel 
state proceedings as an “outer boundar[y]” of a district court’s 
jurisdictional DJA discretion). 
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revealed as relevant factors governing the exercise of a 
district court’s discretion.”).  
 
Many of our sister circuits have addressed this issue 
and explicitly held that the existence or non-existence of 
pending parallel state proceedings is but one factor for a 
district court to consider when exercising its DJA jurisdiction. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 998 
(8th Cir. 2005); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 
F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. City of Las 
Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1183 (10th Cir. 2002); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 
1998) (per curiam); Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 
103 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other 
grounds by Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc). We agree. Our decision in Summy does 
not compel a different result. Summy circumscribes a district 
court’s discretion to exercise jurisdiction and “suggests 
relevant considerations” for a district court’s analysis. 234 
F.3d at 134, 136. We do not read Summy to create a rule that 
tethers a district court’s DJA discretion to whether a party has 
or has not filed a parallel action in state court. Indeed, Summy 
itself lists pending state proceedings addressing the same 
issues as one non-exhaustive factor. Id. at 134.
19
  
                                              
19
 Further, many of the cases cited by Westport found that 
Summy did not compel them to decline jurisdiction in the 
absence of parallel state proceedings. See, e.g., Ackerman v. 
Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00005, 2012 WL 1377392, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012) (finding jurisdiction 
“proper” where, inter alia, “no underlying state court action 
[created] an existing, and more apt, forum”); Westfield Ins. 
Co. v. Wertz, No. 10-03066, 2011 WL 2135579, at *3 (E.D. 
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 In light of the foregoing authorities, we conclude that 
it is not a per se abuse of discretion for a court to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction when pending parallel state proceedings 
do not exist. Nor is it a per se abuse of discretion for a court 
to exercise jurisdiction when pending parallel state 
proceedings do exist. Rather, the existence or non-existence 
of pending parallel state proceedings is but one factor for a 
district court to consider. We concur with the Fourth Circuit 
that holding otherwise would “be inconsistent with our long-
standing belief that district courts should be afforded great 
latitude in determining whether to grant or deny declaratory 
relief.” Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d at 423. 
  
 Although our sister circuits have found the existence 
or non-existence of pending parallel state proceedings only to 
be but one factor, they have placed upon it increased 
emphasis. E.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 997–98 
(holding that DJA discretion is diminished in absence of 
parallel state proceedings); Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 
394 (absence of parallel state proceeding is “important 
factor,” which weighs “strongly against dismissal”); Ind-Com 
                                                                                                     
Pa. May 27, 2011) (finding that lack of parallel state action 
was a factor which weighed in favor of exercising 
jurisdiction); TIG Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., No. 3:08-cv-
1584, 2009 WL 151597, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2009) 
(finding jurisdiction appropriate because lack of pending state 
proceedings meant that it did not “disrupt the state-federal 
balance by entertaining a claim that may be the subject of a 
future state court action”). This is different from saying that 
Summy compelled these courts to exercise jurisdiction. 
Rather, what they exercised was their discretion. 
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Elec. Co., 139 F.3d at 423 (existence of state proceeding is 
“significant factor”); Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 103 F.3d at 754 
(existence of parallel state proceeding is “major factor”). We 
agree and believe the absence of pending parallel state 
proceedings militates significantly in favor of exercising 
jurisdiction, although it alone does not require such an 
exercise. In this circumstance, as part of exercising sound and 
reasoned discretion, district courts declining jurisdiction 
should be rigorous in ensuring themselves that the lack of 
pending parallel state proceedings is outweighed by opposing 
factors. This same rationale applies when state proceedings 
do exist. The existence of pending parallel state proceedings 
militates significantly in favor of declining jurisdiction, 
although it alone does not require doing so. In this 
circumstance, as part of exercising sound and reasoned 
discretion, district courts exercising jurisdiction should be 
rigorous in ensuring themselves that the existence of pending 
parallel state proceedings is outweighed by opposing factors.  
 
  5.   
 When addressing this question, our sister circuits have 
commonly articulated anew or reiterated sets of factors for 
district courts to consider when exercising their sound and 
reasoned discretion.
20
 See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co., 426 F.3d 
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 We list them for the convenience of all concerned. In the 
Fourth Circuit, district courts should consider (1) whether 
declaratory relief “will serve a useful purpose in clarifying 
and settling the legal relations in issue”; (2) whether 
declaratory relief “will terminate and afford relief from the 
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the 
proceeding”; (3) “the strength of the state’s interest in having 
 33 
 
                                                                                                     
the issues raised in the federal declaratory judgment action 
decided in the state courts”; (4) “whether the issues raised in 
the federal action can more efficiently be resolved in the court 
in which the state action is pending”; (5) “whether permitting 
the federal action to go forward would result in unnecessary 
‘entanglement’ between the federal and state court systems 
because of the presence of overlapping issues of fact or law”; 
and (6) “whether the declaratory judgment action is being 
used merely as a device for ‘procedural fencing’—that is, ‘to 
provide another forum in the race for res judicata’ or ‘to 
achiev[e] a federal hearing in a case otherwise not 
removable.’” Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d at 422 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, 
Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 1994); Mitcheson v. Harris, 
955 F.2d 235, 237–40 (4th Cir. 1992); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1937)).  
 In the Fifth Circuit, district courts must consider “(1) 
whether there is a pending state action in which all of the 
matters in controversy may be fully litigated; (2) whether the 
plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the 
defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum 
shopping in bringing the suit; (4) whether possible inequities 
in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in 
time or to change forums exist; (5) whether the federal court 
is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses; (6) 
whether retaining the lawsuit would serve the purposes of 
judicial economy; and (7) whether the federal court is being 
called on to construe a state judicial decree involving the 
same parties and entered by the court before whom the 
parallel state suit between the same parties is pending.” 
Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 388 (quoting St. Paul Ins. 
Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590–91 (5th Cir. 1994)).  
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 The Seventh Circuit has identified four factors: 
whether (1) “the declaratory suit presents a question distinct 
from the issues raised in the state court proceeding”; (2) “the 
parties to the two actions are identical”; (3) “going forward 
with the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in 
clarifying the legal obligations and relationships among the 
parties or will merely amount to duplicative and piecemeal 
litigation”; and (4) “comparable relief is available to the 
plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment in another forum or 
at another time.” Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 692 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
 The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Fourth Circuit’s 
test. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 998.  
 The Ninth Circuit has suggested the following 
considerations: (1) party convenience; (2) the availability and 
relative convenience of alternate remedies, and whether the 
declaratory action (3) “will settle all aspects of the 
controversy;” (4) “will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the 
legal relations at issue;” (5) “is being sought merely for the 
purposes of procedural fencing or to obtain a ‘res judicata’ 
advantage; or” (6) “will result in entanglement between the 
federal and state court systems.” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5 
(quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 145 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (Garth, J. concurring)). 
 The Tenth Circuit’s factors are “(1) whether a 
declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2) whether it 
would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations 
at issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used 
merely for the purpose of ‘procedural fencing’ or ‘to provide 
an arena for a race to res judicata’; (4) whether use of a 
declaratory action would increase friction between our federal 
and state courts and improperly encroach upon state 
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at 998–99 (collecting cases). We find that establishing a 
uniform approach from the many sets of factors will better 
clarify for parties and district courts the relevant 
considerations to sound and reasoned discretion, as well as 
help properly focus our abuse of discretion review.  
 
 Thus, when determining whether to exercise DJA 
jurisdiction, in addition to consulting the Brillhart factors,
21
 a 
district court should guide its exercise of sound and reasoned 
discretion by giving meaningful consideration to the 
following factors to the extent they are relevant: 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy 
which is better or more effective.” State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825 F.2d 1061, 1063 (6th Cir. 
1987)). 
21
 In circumstances like Brillhart’s, courts should consider 
“whether the questions in controversy between the parties to 
the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under the 
applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the 
proceeding pending in the state court.” Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 
495. Answering this question may require inquiring  
 
into the scope of the pending state court 
proceeding . . . the nature of the defenses open 
there. . . . whether the claims of all parties in 
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that 
proceeding, whether necessary parties have 
been joined, whether such parties are amenable 
to process in that proceeding, etc.  
 
Id. 
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(1) the likelihood that a federal court declaration will 
resolve the uncertainty of  obligation which gave rise 
to the controversy; 
 (2) the convenience of the parties; 
 (3) the public interest in settlement of the 
uncertainty of obligation;  
(4) the availability and relative convenience of other 
remedies; 
(5) a general policy of restraint when the same issues 
are pending in a state court; 
 (6) avoidance of duplicative litigation; 
(7) prevention of the use of the declaratory action as a 
method of procedural  fencing or as a means to 
provide another forum in a race for res judicata;  
 and  
(8) (in the insurance context), an inherent conflict of 
interest between an insurer’s duty to defend in a state 
court and its attempt to characterize that suit in federal 
court as falling within the scope of a policy 
exclusion.
22
 
                                              
22
 We articulate this criteria in awareness of the Ninth 
Circuit’s troubled experience with requiring its district courts 
“to consider the discretionary nature of [their] jurisdiction at 
the outset of the case” even in the absence of a pending state 
action and where the parties did not raise the issue below. 
Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1223 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. v. F.H., 117 F.3d 435, 437 (9th Cir. 1997)). We express 
no opinion today whether district courts, prior to exercising 
DJA jurisdiction, must always address the appropriateness of 
doing so even when not raised by the parties. We merely hold 
that, when the propriety of DJA jurisdiction is raised by the 
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These factors are non-exhaustive, and there will be situations 
in which district courts must consult and address other 
relevant case law or considerations.
23
 For example, in 
insurance cases, (and to the extent Summy applies elsewhere) 
Summy’s additional guidance should also be considered. The 
weighing of these factors should be articulated in a record 
sufficient to enable our abuse of discretion review.  
 
 Enumerating these factors requires us to address the 
Owens trend followed by the District Court. This trend could 
be problematic for two reasons. First, there is nothing to 
distinguish these cases from any other declaratory judgment 
action that invokes diversity jurisdiction and asks federal 
                                                                                                     
parties or by the district court sua sponte, the district court 
should meaningfully consider the above guides in exercising 
its sound and reasoned discretion. This weighing should be 
articulated in a record sufficient to enable our abuse of 
discretion review.  
23
 We understand the holding of Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources to 
have been derived from consideration of the above factors. 
923 F.2d at 1076 (“We turn now to the application of these 
many factors to the facts before us.”) To the extent that case 
articulated additional relevant considerations, district courts 
facing the same or similar issues should continue to consult 
its guidance. See, e.g., Summy, 234 F.3d at 134 (citing Pa, 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1076–79) (noting that district 
courts facing issues of “federal statutory interpretation, the 
government’s choice of a federal forum, an issue of sovereign 
immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceeding,” do not 
have open-ended discretion to decline jurisdiction). 
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courts to declare the rights of parties under settled state law. 
Placing our imprimatur on this exercise of discretion might on 
its face appear to permit declining jurisdiction per se in every 
such case. We are less than confident that wholesale, 
“revolving door” dismissal of such cases evidences a 
discretion that is either “sound,” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286, or 
“reasoned,” Bituminous Coal Operators’ Assoc., 585 F.2d at 
596. See, e.g., Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 
238 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding abuse of discretion 
where district court failed to consider relevant factors and 
dismissed declaratory judgment suit “simply because it [did] 
not involve a question of federal law” (quoting St. Paul Ins. 
Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 591 n.10 (5th Cir. 1994))). This is 
especially true where “[f]ederal and state courts are equally 
capable of applying settled state law to a difficult set of 
facts.” Heritage Farms Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 
747 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Note, Land Use Regulation, the 
Federal Courts and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 Yale L.J. 
1134, 1143 n.55 (1980)). 
 Second, these cases implicate neither an improper use 
of procedure by insurance companies nor unfairness to 
insureds. While we sympathize with our district courts’ 
apparent frustration over the volume of such cases, we, like 
our sister circuit, “know of no authority for the proposition 
that an insurer is barred from invoking diversity jurisdiction 
to bring a declaratory judgment action against an insured on 
an issue of coverage.” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Merritt, 974 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 
1992)); see also Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 398–400. 
Indeed, we know of no other circuit court which has approved 
the per se dismissal of declaratory judgment actions in these 
circumstances. Rather, as noted above, when pending parallel 
state proceedings do not exist, our sister circuits have 
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articulated extensive, multi-factor tests for district courts to 
consider. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 998–99 
(collecting cases). 
 
 These concerns do not conflict with our holding in 
Summy. Despite our statements noting that such cases have 
“no special call on the federal forum” and that even less 
reason for federal jurisdiction exists when state law is “firmly 
established,” Summy’s holding specifically turned on 
considerations relevant to the pending state court suit. 234 
F.3d at 135–36.  
 
 We reject any reading of Summy that supports per se 
automatic declining of jurisdiction in every such case. On the 
other side of the coin, we also reject Westport’s argument to 
the extent that it implies that, when Summy’s factors are not 
implicated, a district court must exercise its DJA jurisdiction. 
As our non-exhaustive, multi-factor test makes clear, there 
are many potential considerations that properly inform a 
district court’s sound and reasoned discretion. 
  
 6.  
We now turn to whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in this case by declining to exercise its DJA 
jurisdiction. We conclude that declining jurisdiction was 
proper because the lack of pending parallel state proceedings 
was outweighed by another relevant consideration, namely, 
the nature of the state law issue raised by Reifer. Where state 
law is uncertain or undetermined, the proper relationship 
between federal and state courts requires district courts to 
“step back” and be “particularly reluctant” to exercise DJA 
jurisdiction. Id. (“[T]he state’s interest in resolving its own 
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law must not be given short shrift simply because one party 
or, indeed, both parties, perceive some advantage in the 
federal forum.”). The fact that district courts are limited to 
predicting—rather than establishing—state law requires 
“serious consideration” and is “especially important in 
insurance coverage cases.” Id. at 135. 
 
Reifer argues that her claims raise “critical issues of 
state law and public policy that should be decided by 
Pennsylvania state courts.” (Brief of Appellee at 19.) She 
contends that the instant case exemplifies Pennsylvania’s 
“broken state system,” which “[o]nly the state can repair.” 
(Id.) She notes that Russo’s negligence deprived her of her 
livelihood, and that his failure to notify Westport of her claim 
will deprive her of a remedy unless Westport is required to 
show prejudice. Reifer’s argument proceeds in five steps: 
 
(1) Regulation of the practice of law is a 
matter of state law and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court “has inherent and exclusive 
power” to supervise attorney conduct, which it 
does by promulgating governing rules. (Id. at 
19–20 (quoting Pa. R.D.E. 103).)  
(2) Pennsylvania Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.4(c) requires attorneys to disclose 
publically whether they maintain the mandatory 
minimum coverage and notify existing clients if 
their coverage falls below the minimum or 
lapses. 
(3) These mandatory disclosures induce 
reasonable reliance on the belief that the public 
is protected against attorney malpractice. 
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(4) Claims-made policies are the only 
legal malpractice insurance policies available in 
Pennsylvania and, under current Pennsylvania 
law, insurers need not show prejudice before 
denying claims not made during the policy 
period. 
(5) Thus, the protection the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court intends Rule 1.4(c) to provide is 
illusory because a negligent attorney can 
commit malpractice and fail to report a 
malpractice claim, both harming the client and 
the client’s prospect of recovery. This is true 
even if the attorney had malpractice insurance 
during the representation and when the 
malpractice claim was filed. 
 
Reifer argues that Pennsylvania can and should fix this 
system by requiring insurance companies to cover late claims 
unless they can show prejudice. She contends that doing so 
would be a logical next step in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. 
For example, she invokes Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance 
Co., in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—for public 
policy reasons, among others—required insurance companies 
to show prejudice when tardily notified of claims pursuant to 
occurrence contracts. 371 A.2d 193, 198 n.8 (Pa. 1977). She 
admits that Pennsylvania courts have never applied Brakeman 
to claims-made policies such as the one in question here, but 
contends that protecting the public requires doing so. 
 
Westport frames the case as a mundane question of 
insurance coverage. It argues that remand was inappropriate, 
in part, because the relevant state law was well settled and the 
District Court was perfectly capable of applying it. It 
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contends that this case raises only the straightforward issue 
“whether an insurer must prove prejudice before declining 
coverage for late notice under a claims-made policy.” 
(Appellant Br. at 16.) Pennsylvania courts, as well as federal 
courts applying Pennsylvania law, have “unanimously 
answered [this] question in the negative”: Insurance 
companies simply need not show prejudice prior to denying 
coverage on claims-made policies. (Id.) 
 
While we express no opinion on the merits of Reifer’s 
claim, we believe that, at minimum, she makes a nonfrivolous 
argument for possibly carving an exception to governing 
Pennsylvania law in the context of legal malpractice 
insurance contracts. Federal courts are, of course, perfectly 
capable of applying state law, Heritage Farms Inc., 671 F.2d 
at 747, even where nonfrivolous arguments are raised to 
change it; however, we believe this particular case is best 
decided in the state court system. Importantly, Reifer’s 
argument implicates the policies underlying Pennsylvania’s 
rules governing attorney conduct, which are promulgated by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See, e.g., Beyers v. 
Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1090 (Pa. 2007). Reifer’s 
argument unmasks a potentially unintended and unforeseen 
consequence arising out of the nexus of those Rules and 
Pennsylvania insurance law, which places in the hands of 
negligent attorneys the responsibility of ensuring their clients 
receive a remedy. Reifer raises a legitimate concern that 
current Pennsylvania insurance law permits the fox to guard 
the henhouse and hinders realization of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s intent. Thus, we believe her argument—
whatever its merits—is best decided in the Pennsylvania court 
system because it directly raises a matter peculiarly within the 
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purview of that state’s highest court.24 See, e.g., id. (noting 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s “exclusive authority” to 
govern attorney conduct). 
 
Among other reasons, the District Court declined 
jurisdiction “[f]or the sake of comity.” Reifer, 943 F. Supp. 
2d at 511. It noted the importance of respecting the ability of 
the Pennsylvania court system “to enforce its own judgments 
decided by its own Courts of Common Pleas.” Reifer, 2013 
WL 2650275, at *2. We would have preferred the District 
Court to squarely address the alleged novelty of Reifer’s state 
law claims, an argument she raised below. In the future, 
district courts should meaningfully consider the guidance 
discussed above when relevant, as well as any other relevant 
considerations in their exercise of sound and reasoned 
discretion. But under these circumstances we find that neither 
the parties nor judicial efficiency would benefit from a 
remand where we take issue with the District Court’s 
procedures but not its result. We find that the issues raised 
place this case peculiarly within the purview of the 
Pennsylvania courts and that the District Court’s discretionary 
decision achieved the proper result: declining jurisdiction and 
remanding to the state court.
25
 
                                              
24
 Westport argues that Reifer stands in Russo’s shoes, and 
that any individual claims she makes as a client are irrelevant. 
For the same reasons discussed above, we believe the 
Pennsylvania state courts are better suited to determine the 
heights of this alleged barrier to her argument invoking 
Pennsylvania’s rules of attorney conduct, such as whether 
Reifer may amend her complaint to include individual claims.  
25
 We acknowledge that the timing of the District Court’s 
remand raises judicial efficiency concerns. Westport removed 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of 
the District Court to decline DJA jurisdiction and to deny 
reconsideration. 
                                                                                                     
the instant case to federal court on March 23, 2012. The 
parties briefed the relevant issues and the Magistrate Judge 
considered the merits and issued a 39-page report and 
recommendation on October 12, 2012. Reifer and Westport 
expended resources preparing an objection and response 
respectively to the report and recommendation. After all of 
this effort, over one year after the case was originally 
removed, the district court, sua sponte, declined jurisdiction 
and remanded the case back to state court. For the parties to 
receive the declaration of rights they have vigorously 
contested for over two years, another court in another forum 
must now review the identical evidence, case law, and legal 
arguments which were the subject of the Magistrate Judge’s 
detailed report and recommendation. Although the DJA 
confers “unique and substantial discretion” on federal courts 
to determine when to issue a declaratory judgment, such 
discretion is founded on “considerations of practicality and 
wise judicial administration.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. In a 
future case, such considerations may require a district court, 
when declining jurisdiction sua sponte, to do so in a more 
timely fashion than occurred here as a matter of exercising its 
sound and reasoned discretion. In the instant case, for the 
reasons discussed above, we find this factor outweighed by 
Reifer’s state law argument. 
